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Abstract
We investigate how North-South Integration a¤ects the location of FDI between the two
regions. The theoretical analysis suggests that integration a¤ects the incentives of partner and
non-partner Northern countries to locate in the South di¤erently and may lead to investment
diversion from the Northern partner. We test our propositions using data from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the rst major North-South integration scheme.
Using the largest possible control group, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator to nd that
NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico has increased since the inception of NAFTA above what is
implied by other determinants of FDI and the global upward trend during this time. Other
countries have not increased their use of Mexico as an export platform. We nd some, though
weak evidence that inward U.S. FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of
di¤erent model and econometric specications as well as the skill data used.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional integration
schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Europe while at the
same time continuing its move towards deepintegration, allowing for free movement of labor and
capital and introducing a single currency. Many developing countries in Asia and South America
have pursued economic integration amongst themselves (ASEAN, Mercosur) or have sought free
trade agreements with other developed countries or blocs, such as the EU or the United States. In
North America, the 1989 U.S.-Canada free trade agreement was followed quickly by the inclusion
of Mexico into a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The latter had been unique at
the time as it combined two advanced developed with a developing country, a phenomenon dubbed
the new regionalismby Ethier (1998).
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important e¤ects on international economic
interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements has focused on their impact on trade
ows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the partners in the agreement) and
trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement). But economic integration and its
coincident reduction in trade barriers also alters the incentives for rms when making their location
decisions. With NAFTA, the conventional wisdom is that the reduced trade barriers facing exports
from Mexico into the U.S. increase the incentive for rms to locate in Mexico, whose labor costs
are low compared to the U.S. and other developed countries, and use it as an export platform.
Another important reason why one would expect NAFTA to change the location pattern of
multinational rms is the commitment e¤ect conveyed by the agreement. The commitment value
arises as integration agreements bind future regimes to reforms undertaken and acts beyond any
e¤ects due to specic provisions of the agreement. Thus it can help alleviate the well-known time
inconsistency problem whereby countries have an incentive to impose a higher tax rate ex post
although they had committed to national treatment for foreign investors ex ante. This consideration
is particularly relevant for Mexico with its history of political instability, default and expropriations.
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Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1998) show that a trade accord indeed allows a country to sustain a
higher level of investment than without it. Waldkirch (2006) examines the case of two Northern
and one Southern country and nds that following integration between the Southern and one of
the Northern countries, the commitment e¤ect more strongly a¤ects partner than non-partner
investment due to trade creation and trade diversion e¤ects.1
Hence, while the incentive to locate in Mexico rather than in one of the two advanced partners
exists for all rms, these incentives di¤er for rms from partner versus rms from non-partner
countries for a number of reasons. First, beyond the di¤erential commitment e¤ect, the Maquiladora
program provided for reduced duties for Mexican exports into the U.S. even before NAFTA. Upon
re-importation, Section 9802 of the U.S. Harmonized Tari¤ Schedule stipulates that only the value-
added part of the imported good is subject to duties. Moreover, U.S. duties were relatively low
even before NAFTA. Hence, NAFTA may not greatly increase the incentive for U.S. rms to locate
more production in Mexico as compared to non-U.S. rms. Second, as a free trade area rather
than a customs union, NAFTA has relatively strict rules of origin. For example, 62.5 percent of an
automobile must have North American content in order to qualify for duty-free treatment. This
may reduce or increase the incentive for non-US rms to locate in Mexico. On the one hand, the
size of the investment may be bigger than optimal in the absence of rules of origin. On the other
hand, trying to force locating a production process that may be optimally placed at home, e.g.
skilled labor intensive production, may tilt the incentive towards not locating any production in
the free trade area. Finally, NAFTA reduces the trade cost of shipping any intermediate inputs to
Mexico from the U.S., but not from other countries.
This paper investigates the e¤ect of North-South integration on the location of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in both regions. The empirical analysis uses the case of NAFTA and pays special
attention to partner versus non-partner country FDI. Despite the great importance of the e¤ects of
economic integration on rm location, there is a dearth of empirical work in that area. Waldkirch
1Of course, aggreements are subject to renegotiation or withdrawal, which in the case of NAFTA are possible,
though unlikely.
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(2003) uses aggregate inward FDI data for Mexico to nd that NAFTA appears to have raised FDI
from the U.S., but not from other countries. Cuevas et al. (2005) use results from a cross-country
study to estimate a NAFTA e¤ect on FDI generally of about 70 percent, but do not distinguish
the source of investment. Similarly, MacDermott (2007), using OECD data from 1980-1997, nds
an increase in FDI following NAFTA in participating countries but no intra-NAFTA e¤ect.
Our contribution to the literature is to investigate the e¤ect of NAFTA on FDI comprehensively
by considering Mexican as well as U.S. inward FDI from various sources. Moreover, by employing
a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator on the largest possible sample of global FDI, we are better able
to disentangle the e¤ects of NAFTA from other changes in the world economy, such as a worldwide
rise in multinational activity in the 1990s, unlike the aforementioned studies.
To motivate the empirical analysis, which is the main contribution of the paper, we consider a
three-country model (two Northern countries and one Southern country) based on Ekholm et al.
(2007).2 The Southern country is the low-cost location and rms from either Northern country may
locate the nal goods assembly process in the Southern country. Initially, trade costs are the same
among all countries3. Then, one of the Northern countries integrates with the Southern country.
We can think of this scenario as depicting the integration of the United States and Canada (the
North) with Mexico in NAFTA. Our model di¤ers from Ekholm et al. (2007) in the following
respects. First, we do not conne the production of intermediate goods to a rms home market;
instead we assume that at least one of the production facilities -intermediate or nal- must be
located in the home market. Second, we assume that rmsxed costs are invariant to location
strategy. Having made this assumption, we focus on di¤erent location congurations for sales only
in the large, high-cost economy integrating with the small, low-cost economy. Third, our results
point out that regional integration not only leads the outsider Northern rm to shift production
from the insider Northern economy to the low-cost, Southern economy but also back to its home
2Grossman et al. (2006) examine the integration strategies of heterogeneous multinational rms in a three-country
setting. They do not consider economic integration e¤ects, although their model could be extended to do that.
Motta and Norman (1996) analyze integration in a three-country model. However, in their model there is no scope
for vertical FDI since nal goods production takes place in a single stage. In our model, on the other hand, the
location of intermediate goods production is in the strategy space we consider.
3Note, however, that we do incorporate the features of the Maquiladora program discussed above.
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country.4
There are a number of predictions that emerge from our model. Chief among them is that
not only may North-South integration increase FDI in the South by partner rms, but it may also
decrease investment in the North, ceteris paribus, which we term FDI diversion. The e¤ect on
non-partner investment in Mexico is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, the reduction in
trade barriers makes Mexico more attractive as an export platform. On the other hand, regional
integration may not only lead non-partner FDI to be shifted from the North to the South but also
back to its home country as partner country rms become more competitive in the large integrated
market, unlike in Ekholm et al. (2007). We then test these propositions via a single di¤erence as
well as a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator. We include the standard determinants of FDI identied
in the recent work of Markusen (2002), which reduces the likelihood of spurious correlations, thus
increasing our condence that we indeed isolate the e¤ect of NAFTA.
We use the standard FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that has been
widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity, e.g. by Brainard (1997),
Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002), Blonigen et al. (2003) and Yeaple (2003) and add
data on inward Mexican FDI from INEGI, the Mexican National Statistical Institute. In order to
have the broadest possible sample of non-NAFTA countries for the di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis,
we also use bilateral OECD FDI data. Since we need to identify source countries of investment
and use compatible data from all sources, our data are stock data at the aggregate level. While
most studies using U.S. data use a¢ liate sales, such data are not available for Mexico. Only ows
and stocks of FDI are available. We cannot add industry detail either, in large part because no
industry-source country detail is available for Mexico prior to 1994.In order to estimate the e¤ects
of NAFTA, however, we need a reasonable amount of pre-NAFTA data.
Our empirical results indicate that since NAFTAs inception, FDI in Mexico from the U.S. and
4By focusing on NAFTAs e¤ect on the United States and Mexico, we do not imply that FDI in or from Canada
would not be a¤ected. However, NAFTA can largely be viewed as Mexicos addition to the existing U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which we analyze in this paper. A detailed study of NAFTAs e¤ect on the distribution
of FDI between the U.S. and Canada is undertaken in Waldkirch and Tekin-Koru (2009).
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Canada has increased, but not from other countries. Indeed, there is some evidence of a slight
fall from the latter. We also nd some, though weak evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S. We
caution, however, that we only include foreign investment data in our empirical analysis, while
our model allows for a strictly domestic location conguration as well. Thus, we are not able to
identify U.S. investments that switch from being domestic before, but become foreign (Mexican)
after NAFTA. The potential investment diversion we account for is solely by non-U.S. rms.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be robust. We carefully correct for both country-
pair specic autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis. We model
FDI in a traditional gravity specication as well as the widely used knowledge-capital model one.
We use skill data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, e.g., Carr et al.
(2001), but also the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, e.g., Blonigen et al. (2003).
The results are also robust to the consideration of an announcement e¤ect since NAFTA was
anticipated before its formal inception.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out a three-country model of the location
choice of rms. While it restricts the set of possible location congurations for tractability, it
is su¢ ciently general to allow for a range of relevant cases. The following section presents the
empirical model which is designed to allow testing of the main hypotheses generated by the theory.
After a discussion of our econometric approach and the data, the empirical results are presented,
followed by concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simple model of location choice and economic integration. There are
three countries, two (initially identical) high- and one low cost country. There exists one rm in
each of the high-cost countries that is faced with the decision where to produce an intermediate
good and where to assemble the nal good. We rst formulate the assumptions and the game played
by the rms. We cannot nd an analytical solution to the quantity-location game. While we could
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use numerical simulations as in Ekholm et al. (2007), we instead concentrate on the equilibrium
candidates by dropping the strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values. The remaining
nodes of the game represent the "feasible equilibria". Then, we consider two scenarios: one where
there is no economic integration and one where one of the high cost and the low cost country
integrate. Finally, we compare the results of these two games to arrive at testable hypotheses.
Consider a one-period, two-stage static game in which there are three countries, denoted E, U
and M . Countries E and U are identical; they can be referred to simply as N (North). M is a
small, low cost country in the south. There exist two nal goods sectors; X (increasing returns,
imperfect competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect competition) and one intermediate good
(component) Z. Good Y is produced from a single factor L (Labor), where one unit of L produces
one unit of Y . Good X, on the other hand, is produced using the intermediate good Z and factor
L, both in xed proportions. The linear demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility
function maximized subject to a budget constraint. Income is derived from labor and prots.
maxU = X  


2

X2 + Y subject to L+ = Y + pX (1)
where wages and the price of Y are numeraires. The demand function for good X is as follows:
p =   X (2)
We assume that there are two rms producing X, one headquartered in E and one in U , and
these can be referred to as rms e and u, respectively. Each rm aims to maximize prot in country
U through its choice of production location conguration and the quantities supplied to the market.
In the rst stage of this location-quantity game, each rm chooses its location conguration and in
the second stage makes its quantity choice in a usual Cournot setting by taking the market location
conguration from the previous stage as given. A strategy for rm h has two elements:
(i) the rms production location conguration for sales in country U which is a set of ordered
pairs
lh = fijg (3)
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where h = (e; ug: The rst element i signies the location choice for the intermediate goods
production and the second one j for the nal goods production. The conguration lu =
fUMg, for example, means that rm u supplies its own market from an assembly plant in M
which uses components produced in U . We assume that at least one of the production facilities
-intermediate or nal- must be located in the home market. As a further simplication, we
assume that any production in M consists of nal assembly. In essence, this connes the
intermediate goods production sites to i = fE;Ug and the nal goods assembly can be done
anywhere, j = fE;U;Mg. Finally, since M is a small country, we assume that it has no
domestic demand, and so neither rm will build a plant in M simply to serve M . These
assumptions still leave us with a wealth of possibilities to explore such that there are a total
of 4 location congurations for each rm which generates 16 potential market supply strategies
in country U . Dene a market location conguration as:
l = fle; lug 2 L (4)
where L is the set of all possible production location congurations for sales in country U .
(ii) the rms quantity choice which is
xh(l) (5)
where xh(l) > 0 indicates that rm h is active in country U ; xh(l) = 0 indicates that rm h
chooses not to sell in country U . Costs of production for the two rms are assumed identical.
Unit costs for components production in country i; (zi) and nal goods production in country
j; (cj) need not be identical. These costs are identical across E and U , but lower in M , i.e.
zM < zN and cM < cN .
Establishment by rm h of a production facility in country i or j incurs a set-up cost F and
we simplify the analysis by assuming that these set-up costs are neither country nor rm specic.
Observe that a rms quantity choice in two markets is independent and determined by the market
location conguration l; and therefore the total set-up cost of establishing production facilities for
sales in country U always adds up to 2F .
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Trade costs are assumed to be ad-valorem. The tari¤ rate is tij 2 (0; 1); i 6= j for components
trade from country i to country j; and tjk 2 (0; 1); j 6= k for nal goods trade from country j to
country k. We assume that tij = tjk = t for the sake of simplicity. This rate becomes zero between
a country pair in the case of economic integration. On a given link we assume that the cost is the
same in both directions for reciprocity reasons.
Aggregate supply to the consumer in country U given the market location conguration l; is:
X(l) =
X
h
xh(l) (6)
and the aggregate prot to rm h from sales in country U with market location conguration l and
market quantity choice xh(l) is:
h(l; xh(l)) = (1  t)[p(X(l)]xh(l)  bch(lh)xh(l)  2F (7)
where bch(lh) = [1 + t]zi + cj for i = fE;Ug and j = fE;U;Mg: For example if rm e chooses to
produce the intermediates in E and assembles them in U for sales in U , then le = EU . In this case,
the production costs will be bce(le) = [1 + t]zE + cU :
The exception is the conguration, lu = fUMg; where bcu(UM) = zU + cM : Before integration,
tari¤s for imports of nal goods from M to U are only levied on the value-added portion.5 This
is consistent with the Maquiladora program that has been in existence for many years and has
facilitated production in Mexico by U.S. rms. It is important to account for the special provisions
since they a¤ect the impact of North American integration on partner versus non-partner rms.
Denote by Xh(l) the set of possible quantity choices in market U for rm h given the market
location conguration l: The Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the second-stage quantity
sub-game for any market location conguration l is the market quantity choice x(l) such that:6
h(l; x(l))  h(l; xh(l); x h(l)) for all xh(l) 2 Xh(l) (8)
5 If we drop the location indicators and rm superscripts, in the Maquiladora case the prots of rm u can be
written as  = p(X)x  zUx  cMx  tUMzUx  tMU (p(X)  zU )x  2F where (p(X)  zU )x is the value added from
the assembly activities. If tUM = tMU = t; then  = (1  t)p(X)x  bcx  2F where bc = zU + cM :
6See Appendix for prot functions.
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Denote by h(l) the prot to rm h from the Nash equilibrium market quantity choice cor-
responding to the production location conguration l: An equilibrium for the rst-stage location
game is a market location conguration l such that:
h(l)  h(lh; l h) for all l 2 L (9)
2.1 Before Integration
Table 1 presents the market supply strategies and their associated payo¤s before integration. Each
cell is assigned a number which is stated at the lower left corner of the corresponding cell. The
payo¤s are the prots made by each rm in the equilibrium of the Cournot game. Each cell in this
table represents a market location conguration, l = fle; lug 2 L where elements of l describe the
respective supply strategies of rms e and u in country U . For example, cell number 6 in Table 1
is l = fEU;UMg which translates as follows: Firm e supplies country U from an assembly plant
in U which uses components produced in E, whereas rm u supplies country U from an assembly
plant in M which uses components produced in U .
We cannot nd an analytical solution to this quantity-location game. While we could use
numerical simulations, we instead concentrate on the equilibrium candidates by dropping the strictly
dominated strategies for all parameter values. Then we derive the changes in these candidates due
to economic integration. The shaded cells in the tables are the candidates for equilibria in this
quantity-location game, namely the feasible equilibria.7 Any one or more than one of these cells
can be the equilibrium/equilibria depending on the parameter values.
Before economic integration between U and M , UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies
for rm u and UE is a strictly dominated strategy for rm e. The intuition is that if rm u
outsources any part of its production process, it will always be to M since it has lower production
cost than E, while trade cost are no higher.
Lemma 1 Prior to integration between U and M, if u does not invest in M, neither does e.
7A sample of the calculations that generate these results can be obtained from the authors on request.
9
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for rm u is lu

= UU for sales in U , then EM can never be the
dominant strategy for rm e. Note that rm e always deviates from cell number 3 to cell number 2
since the condition for UU to be dominant for rm u also satises the condition for EU to dominate
EM for rm e. If rm u chooses to remain national, then even though unit costs are lower in M ,
rm e will not prefer to produce intermediates in E, ship them to M for assembly and reship the
nished product to U and thus pay tari¤s twice. In other words, if rm u chooses UU over UM ,
then rm e will never choose EM over EU since the production cost di¤erences between North
(E and U) and South (M) are not large enough to cover trade costs for both the shipment of the
intermediates and the nal products for rm e to prefer EM:
2.2 After Integration
Given that we are chiey interested in the e¤ects of North American economic integration on foreign
direct investment, we concentrate on the case in which a regional bloc is established between
countries U and M: In that case, the tari¤ barriers on both intermediate and nal goods trade
between U and M are completely lifted, making tUM = tMU = 0.
Table 2 shows the payo¤ matrix after such integration. Notice the reductions in the number of
candidate equilibria compared to the situation before integration. For rm u; UU , UE and EU are
strictly dominated strategies and UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies for rm e. Only
cells number 7 and 8 remain as equilibrium candidates after integration.8
Changes in the feasible equilibria after economic integration yield a rich set of propositions
about FDI creation/diversion in each of the production locations. We restrict our attention to the
possibilities which can be derived analytically without numerical simulations. All of our propositions
assume that demand in both markets remains una¤ected by integration.
8 Intuitively, one expects EM to dominate EE for rm e after integration since it involves lower assembly costs
and a tari¤ only on the intermediate goods as opposed to higher assembly costs and a tari¤ on the nal good in
case of EE. However, note that after integration cell number 8 involves a higher market price when compared to
cell number 7. Therefore, it is possible to observe EE as the dominant strategy for rm e and thus no FDI after
integration. The proof is available upon request.
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Proposition 1 Integration between U and M has an FDI diversion e¤ect in U if le

= EU before
integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition rests on the fact that for rm e, the strategy involving production in U ,
EU , is a dominated strategy after integration. Thus, if before integration the dominant strategy
is le

U = EU , then nal assembly is shifted either to E, in which case there is only investment
diversion, or to M , in which case there is investment creation in M . In other words, investment
diversion from U is by non-partner countries. Note that UU becomes a dominated strategy for
rm u, but since we focus on foreign, not domestic investment, we do not test this prediction of
the model.
Proposition 2 Integration between U and M increases rm us investment in M if lu

= UU before
integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition stems from the fact that UU becomes a dominated strategy for rm u after
integration. If that strategy was dominant before integration, some production is shifted from U
to M which is the dominant strategy for rm u after integration. Another way of interpreting this
result is that economic integration causes new entry into the southern country by rms in U . If
the pre-integration equilibrium is not UU , there may be no change in M -production by rm u.
Proposition 3 Integration between U and M increases third-country (E) investment in M only if
and only if le

= EU and lu

= UU before integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for rm e before integration is le

= EU and lu

= UU for rm u, then
the nal assembly is shifted toM by rm e, and non-partner country investment inM will increase.
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This is due to the fact that the conditions for EU to be dominant for rm e before integration also
satisfy the condition for EM to dominate EE for rm e after integration.
Note that a switch from EM before integration to EE after integration (and thus investment
diversion fromM) is not possible since the condition for EE to be dominated before integration by
any other strategy is the same after integration and does not involve the tari¤ between integrating
countries. However, the condition does involve the unit cost of producing in M . One could model
rules of origin as increasing this unit cost since they force a rm to locate additional parts of the
production process along with the optimally located ones in M in order to achieve the required
minimum local content, as discussed above. In that case, a switch from EM to EE (and thus
investment diversion from M) is a distinct possibility.
This proposition tells us that an increase in export platform FDI inM by non-partner countries
is possible only under special conditions. In other words, if the dominant strategy for rm u before
and after integration is lu

= UM; then rm e supplies the U market with exports from E. This is
formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If rm u has investment in M before integration (the Maquiladora case) then an
increase in third-country (E) investment in M is not possible.
In summary, the model predicts that FDI in U may be diverted toM . Partner and non-partner
country investment in the low-cost country,M , may increase. However, the conditions under which
investment from the partner versus the non-partner country increases di¤er for the two sets of
countries, i.e. the identity of the source country matters. Moreover, there might be circumstances
where there might be no increase or even a decrease in the investments of non-partner countries in
M depending upon the pre-integration equilibrium. Thus, the question whether there is investment
diversion from the U.S. and investment creation/diversion in Mexico, and by whom, is an empirical
one.
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3 Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to test the propositions from our model outlined above while including con-
trol variables drawn from the existing literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment.9
These come from the seminal study by Brainard (1997) and the pioneering work of Markusen (1997)
and Markusen (2002), which were put to an empirical test in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and
Maskus (2002).
We test the propositions generated by our model employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator.
The intuition is to estimate the di¤erence in FDI before and after 1994 for di¤erent host-source
combinations involving NAFTA countries (the treatmentgroup) and compare these to the di¤er-
ence in FDI before and after 1994 for host-source combinations not involving any NAFTA countries
(the controlgroup). We split the treatmentgroup into three in order to test each of our three
propositions from the theoretical model. The rst sub-group are observations for which the U.S. is
the host country of FDI and the source country can be any country other than Canada or Mexico
(h1). The second sub-group includes observations for which Mexico is the host and the U.S. or
Canada are the source countries (h2). The nal sub-group are observations where Mexico is the
host country and the source is any country other than the U.S. and Canada (h3). Each of these
groups is indicated by a dichotomous variable equal to one if the conditions are satised (dhk;
k 2 [1; 2; 3]).
There is also an indicator for the NAFTA period (dN ) which equals one for the NAFTA time
period (years 1994 and later) and zero before (1993 and earlier).10 In order to obtain the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences, we require interaction terms between each of the country group dummies and the
NAFTA dummy.
9Ekholm et al. (2007) also conduct an empirical analysis, which, however, is very di¤erent from ours. Their
dependent variable is the share of a¢ liate sales of US multinationals that go to third countries rather than foreign
investment. They only use US data and do not have a breakdown of these shares by country.
10As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of NAFTA in consideration of a possible announcement e¤ect.
We also experimented with including separate dichotomous variables for 1994 onwards and 1999 onwards, recognizing
that tari¤ cuts were phased in. This did not change the results (Available upon request).
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Thus, FDI in host i from source j at time t is given by
FDIijt = + dN +
3X
k=1
kdhk +
3X
k=1
k (dN  dhk) (10)
The coe¢ cients k on the interaction term constitute the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator.
To see this, note that  is the baseline e¤ect for observations that are pre-NAFTA (dN = 0) and
are not of a (future) NAFTA host (dhk = 0 8 k). Then,  +  is the e¤ect of NAFTA on non-
NAFTA hosts. The di¤erence, i.e. the NAFTA-e¤ectfor the control group, is therefore given by
+  = . For host type k, the pre- and post-NAFTA e¤ects on FDI are given by + k (only
dhk = 1) and ++ k+ k (dhk = 1 and dN = 1), respectively. Again, the di¤erence between the
two is the simple NAFTA-e¤ectand is given by +  + k + k   (+ k) =  + k. Hence, the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate is the di¤erence between the simple NAFTA e¤ect for host type k
( + k) minus the simple NAFTA e¤ect for the control group (), which equals k, the coe¢ cient
on the interaction term.
Proposition 1, which states the possibility of FDI diversion from the U.S., implies that 1 is
negative. Propositions 2 and 3, which state the possibility of increased FDI in Mexico from NAFTA.
and other countries, respectively, imply signicantly positive 2 and 3, respectively. While the
signs, magnitudes and signicance levels of the ks are going to be of central interest, we will
also report the single di¤erence results ( + k) in order to ascertain to what extent the NAFTA
e¤ect would be overestimated by not comparing it to broader changes in FDI around the time of
NAFTAs inception.11
Two comments on the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator are in order before we
proceed to the other controls included in the empirical model. First, since the e¤ects of NAFTA
that we identify here are all relative to a control group, the identity of the control group matters.
Initially, we used two di¤erent control groups. The rst includes all FDI observations among
non-NAFTA countries as well as U.S. and Canadian outward FDI. The latter is outside of our
model and one could argue that most of that FDI is in other highly-developed countries which are
11Note that the theoretical model provides us with no a priori expectations for the individual coe¢ cients ,  and
k. Thus, we limit our discussion to the simple and di¤erence-in-di¤erences e¤ects.
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quite dissimilar from Mexico and are thus unlikely to contain many competing hosts. However,
increasingly other low-cost countries, in particular in South-East Asia, are attracting developed
country FDI. Moreover, our hypothesis that U.S. FDI is more likely to go to Mexico due to its
relative increase in attractiveness should a¤ect its outward FDI to other countries, even though we
do not model this explicitly. Hence, our second control group consists only of FDI between countries
other than the three North American ones. We report results from using the latter in the text and
tables and note any di¤erence in the results using the wider control group in a footnote. The
second issue pertains to econometric problems in the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator
as detailed in Bertrand et al. (2004). We discuss how we address these in the next section.
For other control variables to include in the empirical model, we appeal to the standard FDI
literature. We employ the most general specication from Markusen and Maskus (2002) as our
base specication. We also use similar specications to those suggested in Blonigen et al., 2003,
Braconier et al., 2005, and Waldkirch, 2003.12
Thus, we augment the model by including the following controls:
FDI = f
0B@ sumgdp; gdpdi¤sq ; d2skdgdpd; d2skdsumg; d1skdsumg;
invcosthost ; openhost; opensrc; distance
1CA (11)
The rst term, sumgdp, is expected to be positive as larger combined market size will encourage
foreign production. The second term, gdpdi¤sq, squared di¤erences in GDP between the host and
the parent country of foreign investment, is expected to be negative as unequal-sized countries
should encourage exporting rather than setting up a plant in the foreign market.
The next three terms are more complicated interaction terms. The third term, d2skdgdpd,
interacts skill di¤erences with GDP di¤erences and a dummy equal to one if the skilled labor
abundant country is the parent country. Multinationals are discouraged if skill and GDP di¤erences
are too large since the market of the small country is too small and the skilled labor abundant parent
country has a comparative advantage in (skill-intensive) headquarter services. The other two terms
12For a detailed discussion of the knowledge-capital model and its empirical implementation, see Markusens (2002)
book.
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are interactions of GDP sums and skill di¤erences. The fourth term, d2skdsumg, is again nonzero
if the parent country is skilled-labor intensive. Skill di¤erences encourage vertical di¤erentiation
of the production process, but not horizontal multinationals, since skill di¤erences make skilled
labor too expensive in that case. Therefore, its sign is theoretically ambiguous. The next term,
d1skdsumg, is nonzero if the skilled labor abundant country is the host country of investment. If
this is the case, inward FDI is discouraged for all types of multinationals since the skilled labor
abundant country would be expected to be the parent, but not the host country of investment.13
Four additional controls are included. First is a measure of the cost of investing in the host
country. It accounts for formal investment barriers as well as the overall economic climate that
a¤ects the decision where to invest. Higher investment costs deter FDI and hence a negative sign is
expected for this regressor. Parent country and host country (Mexican) trade costs are measured by
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, an often used measure for the trade openness of a country.
It is used over others because it is available for the entire sample period. Since greater openness
corresponds to lower trade costs, a positive sign is expected for parent country, but a negative
sign for host country trade costs.14 Finally, distance is measured as the distance between country
capitals. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy for both trade and investment costs.
We also appeal to the well-known gravity model as a robustness check. In the gravity model,
the total volume of interactions between two countries -in our case FDI- is proportional to the
product of their economic size and diminishes with the distance between the two locations. The
model is often extended by including variables to account for income per-capita, trade costs, sea
access, language relationships, contiguity, and colonial history. We use both the standard and the
extended specications, and augment our model by including the following controls:
lFDI = f
0B@ lgdphost; lgdpsrc; ldistance; lgdpchost; lgdpcsrc; lopenhost; lopensrc;
seahost; seasrc; lang; border; colony
1CA (12)
We estimate a double log specication since the multiplicative nature of the gravity equation
13Results are virtually unchanged if we include simpler skill variables for both source and host countries instead.
14Endogeneity may be a concern with this openness measure. However, other measures such as an index from the
Global Competitiveness Report are highly correlated with any measure of investment cost. In any case, omitting the
openness variables does not change the qualitative results.
16
means that we can take natural logs and obtain a linear relationship between log FDI and other
controls. The rst two terms, lgdphost and lgdpsrc, are the logs of the host and source country
GDPs, respectively, and expected to have a positive impact on bilateral FDI since larger masses
attract each other. The third term ldistance is the log of the distance between country capitals,
also included in our basic specication.
The next two terms, lgdpchost and lgdpcsrc, are the logs of the GDP per-capita in the host
and the source countries, respectively. The expected signs of these two variables are positive since
higher income countries conduct more FDI, possibly as a result of superior infrastructure. We use
the logs of trade openness, lopenhost and lopensrc; to proxy for trade costs and the expected signs
are the same as in the knowledge-capital model that we discuss above. Sea access of the host and
the source countries, seahost and seasrc; should have a positive e¤ect on FDI since it enhances
intra-rm trade ows. These dummy variables take the value of 1 if the country has sea access
and zero other wise. The next three terms are dummy variables which take the value of one if the
countries share a common o¢ cial language, a border and a colonial history. All are expected to
have positive signs since lower physical and cultural barriers enhance FDI outcomes.
We should note that ascribing the e¤ects that we nd solely to NAFTA is clearly problematic
as other events during the time period that we are looking at may a¤ect the pattern of FDI as
well and we have only limited ways to control for those. In addition to NAFTA, Mexico joined
the OECD in 1994, but more importantly, the peso crisis in late 1994, early 1995 led to a steep
real depreciation of the peso, followed by a real appreciation in the years afterwards. We control
for these e¤ects by including Mexican GDP, which fell considerably in 1995. We could also include
exchange rates in order to account more directly for the monetary e¤ects of the crisis, but chose to
follow real trade theory which does not have a role for exchange rates. Moreover, at least the real
appreciation of the peso is likely to be endogenous as it may largely be caused by capital inows.15
15We did include exchange rates as a robustness checks, which did not a¤ect the results at all.
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4 Econometric Considerations and Data
4.1 Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were present. Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation can lead to biased standard errors. We implement several proce-
dures to deal with this potential bias. First, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression)
with panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient is assumed to be di¤erent for each observational unit (country pair), but of the rst
order in all cases. The variance-covariance matrix is computed under the assumption that the
disturbances are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across units, where each pair
of cross-sectional units has their own covariance. For each element in the covariance matrix, all
available observations that are common to the two units contributing to the covariance are used to
compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced.16
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample
period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the e¤ects of NAFTA,
we need su¢ cient data for both the pre- and the post-NAFTA time periods. We have at most
seven years of post-NAFTA data (1994-2000) and only use country-pair observations for which we
have at least seven years of pre-NAFTA information for all variables. In order to implement the
correction for autocorrelation, no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap, we
limit ourselves to using post-gap information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is missing,
and 1985 onwards is available, the data for this country-pair starts in 1985. One of the robustness
checks uses a larger number of observations, although a minimum of six must still be imposed in
order to allow for the computation of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for all country pairs.
In addition to estimating a rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient, we also used several of the
other techniques Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest. We report results from one which works well
16We also ran the regressions under the assumption of a common AR coe¢ cient, which resulted in no qualitative
changes in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results. These are available upon request.
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for samples of more than 20 observational units (we have at least 166 country pairs). It requires
estimating standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure between time pe-
riods, using a generalized White-like formula. This estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is
consistent as the number of country pairs tends to innity. We report results from this procedure
since it turns out to be the only one for which the results are qualitatively di¤erent.17
4.2 Data
Mexican FDI data come from the Mexican National Statistical Institute (INEGI). These are FDI
stocks in Mexico from 1980 on, published in U.S. dollars. In the empirical analysis, nominal values
are converted to real dollars using the U.S. producer price index for capital equipment. The data
distinguish ten source countries throughout the sample period. They account for about 90 percent
of total FDI in Mexico. Since 1994, more source country and especially industry detail is available,
but since we need su¢ cient pre-1994 data, we cannot use the additional detail in this study. No
industry or additional source country detail is available retroactively for the time before NAFTA.
For most of the 1980s, investment ows exhibit large variation, for example around the time of
Mexicos nancial crisis in the early 1980s, but do not increase much over time. They do increase
noticeably in the late 1980s and then a large and sustained increase occurs with the inception of
NAFTA. The rst substantial increase in FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with
a major overhaul of Mexicos investment laws in 1989. Many obstacles to foreign investors, such
as licensing requirements and restrictions pertaining to majority ownership, were removed. This
change reversed Mexicos long-standing policy of reserving ownership in many sectors to Mexican
nationals or the Mexican state and encouraging foreign investment only in sectors that were deemed
crucial to the pursuit of import substitution policies. At the same time, and earlier than in many
other countries in the region, substantial privatizations occurred. By 1994, the number of state-
owned enterprises had decreased to only 80, down from 1155. However, as Franko (1999: 158-61)
17Using their suggested bootstrapping method gave us qualitatively very similar results to our basic methodology
of estimating pairwise autocorrelation coe¢ cients.
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points out, foreign investors participated in this sale only to a small degree. FDI from privatization
constituted only 7.9 percent of total FDI between 1990 and 1995. Yet, during the rst half of the
1990s, Mexico was the major recipient of FDI in Latin America. Brazil subsequently surpassed
Mexico in that role, mainly because Brazils major privatizations occurred in the second half of
the 1990s. Lately, greeneld investment and acquisitions of local rms have dominated in Mexico.
In 1997, 62 percent of FDI consisted of international investors acquiring local rms. According to
CEPAL (1999), recent large acquisitions include several banks, beverage and tobacco companies.
The United States has been the most important source country both before and after 1994.
Sizable ows have also originated in European Union countries and Japan. The share of North
American investment in Mexico in terms of stocks has been relatively stable over the sample period,
uctuating between about 69 and 74 percent. The vast majority of foreign investment originates
in other high-income countries. The only sizable investment ows from other countries are from
South Korea (now also considered high-income) and India, the latter being largely a one-time large
purchase of a Mexican steel company.
U.S. inward and outward FDI data come from the standard source used in most studies of U.S.
FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data are described in detail elsewhere. Figure
1 shows the evolution of FDI in Mexico by source and the United States since 1980. OECD FDI
data come from the OECDs International Direct Investment Statistics.18
Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data from
the Penn World Tables (6.2). Trade data come from the same source. For investment costs, we
use the comprehensive measure from Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), which is
a composite measure of operations risk, political risk, and a remittance and repatriation factor
index. We adjust it such that a higher number corresponds to higher costs. Additional gravity-
model controls are from the distances database of Centre DEtudes Prospectives et DInformations
18We use inward Mexican data from INEGI rather than the BEA or OECD since it is considered an order of
magnitude better quality than outward FDI data. In any case, this is unlikely to matter since the correlation between
the Mexican and the data reported by the OECD for inward Mexican FDI is 0.97 and between the Mexican and BEA
data for their bilateral FDI is 0.99.
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Internationales (CEPII).
An important control variable in many studies is skill. The two most common sources of skill
data are the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee data on schooling. We use
both in our analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. The ILO data measure the number of
workers in a particular occupation and characterize some as skilled, some as unskilled, employing
the skill denitions from Carr et al. (2001). A countrys skill level then is represented by the
share of skilled workers. We ll in missing data using a linear trend between non-missing years.
For just a few countries, additional years are lled in using the growth rate of the skilled labor
share between non-missing years. Alternatively, we use the Barro/Lee data on years of schooling.
These are available only in ve-year intervals and we ll in missing values using a linear trend as
well.19 Table 3 contains summary statistics for our basic sample with a minimum of 14 observations
per country pair as well as for the larger sample where only a minimum of six observations are
required.20
5 Results
Tables 4-6 report the results. Table 4 presents basic results from running a Prais-Winsten regression
as outlined above with a couple of basic robustness checks. Table 5 implements both the simple
and extended gravity equations, and Table 6 shows results from further robustness checks.
Specication (1) in Table 4 is our base specication. The sample contains only source-host
country pairs for which we have at least 14 observations, i.e. su¢ cient pre- and post-NAFTA
information. Specication (2) includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases the
sample size from 2,922 to 5,545 observations. However, many of the newly included country pairs
still have twelve or 13 observations. Specication (3) accounts for a possible announcement e¤ect
by starting the NAFTA regime dummy in 1992 rather than 1994.21
19Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results.
20For the basic sample, we have complete data for 14 years for 29 host and 33 source countries in addition to the
three NAFTA countries.
21Dating the announcement e¤ect to 1991 or 1993 makes no di¤erence to the results. These are available upon
request.
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The top part of the table shows the results for testing our three propositions and reports both
the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and the simple di¤erence ones. We rst notice that there is no evidence
of a FDI diversion e¤ect from the U.S. since there is no statistically signicant negative sign. The
second rows address FDI from NAFTA partners into Mexico. Recall that Proposition 2 suggests
that NAFTA has led to an increase in partner country investment in Mexico. Indeed, our results
indicate a statistically signicant and economically large positive e¤ect. All coe¢ cients, whether
simple di¤erence (+2) or di¤erence-in-di¤erences (2), are positive and signicant regardless of
specication. In order to get a sense of the estimated economic e¤ect, we can calculate the predicted
amount of FDI by the nal year of the sample period with and without NAFTA. Carrying out the
calculation suggests that the inward FDI stock in 2000 is about 12 percent higher than it would have
been without NAFTA. While we acknowledge that this e¤ect includes events that we cannot control
for, NAFTA nonetheless appears to have had an important e¤ect on partner FDI in Mexico.22
The third rows show the estimated NAFTA-e¤ect on FDI from non-NAFTA sources into Mexico.
All coe¢ cients are negative, but only the simple di¤erence ones signicantly so. The estimated
economic magnitude ranges from a 1.5 to a seven percent lower FDI stock. This result illustrates the
importance of controlling for worldwide changes in FDI. Failure to do so would lead us to erroneously
conclude that there was a signicant decrease in export platform FDI in Mexico. Our nding is
consistent with Proposition 3 and Corollary 1. While an increase in third country investment is
possible under very narrow circumstances, the Corollary shows that an increase is not possible if
there had been investment from partner countries in Mexico prior to NAFTA, which empirically
has clearly been the case. Hence, the insignicant result.23
The coe¢ cients on the determinants of FDI in the second half of Table 4 largely have the
expected signs and are statistically signicant. As shown in other work, total market size has
22The estimated magnitude is smaller than what Waldkirch (2003) and Cuevas et al. (2005) nd. Recall that the
estimated e¤ect is not the isolated increase observed in Mexico, but that which goes beyond the global rise and what
can be explained by other determinants of FDI.
23Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted
FDI stocks is 0.65, statistically signicant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies (2004) nd that in their
data, the residuals are unreasonably large and di¤er systematically between rich and poor countries. Our residuals
appear to be of reasonable size and do not di¤er in any systematic way.
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a large positive e¤ect on FDI, whereas market size di¤erences deter it. The signs on the skill
variables are mostly consistent with Markusens knowledge-capital model, although more so when
using the ILO skill data. Consistent with the predictions of that model, both source and host
country openness have a positive e¤ect on FDI, whereas our investment cost measure does not
appear to perform well. This may be because of a lack of variation in the measure, especially over
time.
Table 5 reports the Prais-Winsten results for the gravity model specication. We use the same
sample as in our base specication.24 Column (4) shows the results from the standard gravity
estimation with country sizes and distance only whereas (5) includes additional controls relevant
in an extended gravity model. Both models provide a good t as measured by the R2 which ranges
from 0.80 to 0.84. First, consistent with Proposition 1, though in contrast to our basic results,
we nd FDI diversion from the U.S. by non-partner countries since the relevant coe¢ cient in the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator (1) in columns (4) and (5) is negative and statistically signicant,
particularly in the extended gravity specication. The economic magnitudes are 17 percent and
24, percent, respectively, for the standard and the extended gravity specications. Thus, there is
some evidence of reduced FDI by non-partner countries in the U.S. after the inception of NAFTA.
Second, both the simple di¤erence (+2) and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator (2) pertaining
to FDI from NAFTA partners into Mexico are positive and signicant in both gravity specications
with economic magnitudes of 22 percent and 27 percent, respectively. This result is in line with
Proposition 2 and conrms what we found in our basic specications. Third, neither the simple
nor the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators of the NAFTA-e¤ect of FDI from non-NAFTA sources
into Mexico are statistically signicant, which for the former is in line with our ndings above.
The coe¢ cients on the determinants of FDI in the gravity framework have the expected signs and
are statistically signicant. Bilateral FDI between two countries is positively a¤ected by the size,
income level, adjacency, language relations and colonial history of these countries, and adversely
24Since we employ a double-log estimating equation, we drop 44 out of 2,922 observations with zero FDI (approx-
imately 1.5% of the entire sample).
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a¤ected by the distance between them, as conjectured.
Table 6 presents the results from additional robustness checks. As discussed above, we rst
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Doing so results in far greater magnitudes
on our dichotomous variables of interest, though generally also for greater standard errors. In
particular, the change in NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico, while large, is no longer signicant,
while the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator for non-NAFTA partner FDI in Mexico is signicantly
negative. This result is quite di¤erent from that in all other specications and even though this
method worked well for Bertrand et al.s (2004) data, we are not sure that it is the case here. For
example, consider the average estimated autocorrelation in regressions (1) through (3). It is roughly
between 0.74 and 0.79, much higher than in Bertrand et al.s data, where the true autocorrelation is
comparable to ours in magnitude. Moreover, they do not allow for individual (in our case: country-
pair specic) autocorrelation coe¢ cients, but impose a common one. Thus, we maintain that our
Prais-Winsten methodology is appropriate and yields good results, but we do want to alert the
reader that these can change when using one specic di¤erent methodology.
In contrast, the results are very similar to our basic and gravity specications when using the
Barro/Lee skill data (columns 7 and 8). There appears to be no export-platform FDI e¤ect due to
NAFTA. Instead, the ndings suggest that, rstly, the access to the U.S. market from Mexico was
not greatly a¤ected by NAFTA, and secondly, that onerous rules of origin may indeed have had
a signicant investment preventing e¤ect for investments from countries located outside of North
America, which import a signicant amount of their intermediates from their home countries. The
ndings underscore that it is misleading to ascribe the observed increase in the raw numbers of
FDI following NAFTA to the agreement as doing so fails to control for other important determi-
nants, such as the economic boom in the U.S., and the global rise in FDI. The di¤erential results
with respect to NAFTA partner and non-NAFTA FDI into Mexico also show the importance of
distinguishing between these two fundamentally di¤erent sources of FDI.
In summary, we nd that there is ample evidence that North-South economic integration in
NAFTA has a¤ected the distribution of FDI in the region, although not always in line with con-
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ventional wisdom. There is no evidence of an export-platform e¤ect, but the South (Mexico) has
clearly succeeded in attracting additional investment from the Northern partner countries. There
is some, though weak evidence of an investment diversion e¤ect from the U.S. The inclusion of
determinants of FDI that are well-established in the literature, a careful econometric specication
that corrects for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, a large control group, and the use of various
measures of skill endowments make us condent that our results provide a good assessment of the
e¤ect of NAFTA on the pattern of FDI.
6 Conclusion and Directions for Future Work
This paper has investigated the e¤ect of North-South integration on the location of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in both regions. We built a simple three-country model of location choice. While
the model is straightforward, it generates several interesting propositions. There is a possibility
that NAFTA results in FDI diversion from the United States. While FDI in Mexico is likely to
increase, the incentives for rms from NAFTA partners versus non-partner countries are a¤ected
di¤erently. This is due to the existence of the Maquiladora program before NAFTA, but also to
strict rules of origin and a possible commitment e¤ect that a¤ect partner countries more than
non-partner ones.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that combines U.S., Mexican and bilateral OECD FDI
data to test these hypotheses. Using a careful econometric analysis, we nd that NAFTA partner
FDI in Mexico was positively a¤ected by NAFTA. At the same time, there is some evidence of FDI
diversion from the U.S. Non-NAFTA rms have been using Mexico as an export platform to the
U.S. well before NAFTA and we nd no evidence that NAFTA has resulted in an increasing use
of Mexico as a production location for these countries. If anything, FDI may have decreased. This
nding begs a more thorough investigation of the role of discriminatory regulations in FTAs such
as rules of origin, which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The results are largely robust to model specication, the skill endowment data chosen, the
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consideration of an announcemente¤ect as well as to the inclusion of country-pair observations
with a shorter time series. Moreover, we carefully take the serial correlation in the data into account
and employ specications that avoid biasing our standard errors. We do add the caveat, however,
that use of an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, one of the methodologies proposed by Bertrand
et al. (2004) to deal with the serial correlation problem in the use of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimator, does a¤ect the results somewhat.
In future work, we will consider several extensions, both to the theory and the empirics. The
theory should incorporate plant-level scale economies through an integrated equilibrium approach.
We also envision a dynamic rather than a static game for economic integration, which will be
capable of including announcement and commitment e¤ects more formally. On the empirical side,
we note that even in its current form, our model also provides a rich set of results regarding the
e¤ect of NAFTA on trade within the region as well as with other countries. These conclusions can
be tested using available trade data. We are especially interested in separating out the e¤ects on
intermediate versus nal goods trade.
We also emphasize that we do not wish to imply that the addition of Mexico has had no e¤ect
on the distribution of FDI between Canada and the U.S. However, this raises a host of di¤erent
questions, which deserve their separate treatment, which we undertake in Waldkirch and Tekin-
Koru (2009).
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Appendix
Aggregate prot to rms e and u from sales in country U with production location conguration
L and market quantity choice xh(l) can be expressed respectively as follows:
e(l; xe(l)) = (1  t)[  X(l)]xe(l)  bce(le)xe(l)  2F
u(l; xu(l)) = (1  t)[  X(l)]xu(l)  bcu(lu)xu(l)  2F
where Xk(l) = xe(l) + xu(l):
Maximizing these two equations with respect to xe(l) and xu(l) in that order and solving for
xe(l) and xu(l) in the rst order conditions gives the equilibrium prot levels for each rm as
e(l; xe(l)) = (1  t)[xe(l)]2   2F
u(l; xu(l)) = (1  t)[xu(l)]2   2F
where
xe(l) =
(1  t)2+ (1  t)bcu(lu)  2(1  t)bce(le)
3(1  t)2 and
xu(l) =
(1  t)2+ (1  t)bce(le)  2(1  t)bcu(lu)
3(1  t)2
Proof of Lemma 1
The necessary condition for l = fEM;UUg before integration is given by the following in-
equalities:
ubi(EM;UU) > 
u
bi(EM;UM) (13)
ebi(EM;UU) > 
e
bi(EU;UU) (14)
ebi(EM;UU) > 
e
bi(EE;UU) (15)
which yield respectively
(1  t)[(1  t)1=2   (1  t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(t  1)2   (1  t)1=2(1  3t)]| {z }
A2
(16)
 cN [2(1  t)3=2]| {z }
A3
+ cM [(1  t)1=2 + (1  t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
[(1  t)1=2   (1  t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + 3t)  (1  t)1=2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A5
(17)
 cN [(1  t)1=2 + (1  t)]| {z }
A4
+ 2cM < 0
cN   cM > tzN (18)
Compare (16) and (17). Assuming t 2 (0; 1), the following will hold: (i) 0 < (1   t)A1 < A1; (ii)
0 < A2 < A5 and (iii) 0 < A3 < A4 < 2. Moreover, since cN > cM > 0; zN > 0 and  > 0;
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when (16) holds, (17) does not hold. In other words, if ubi(EM;UU) > 
u
bi(EM;UM), then
ebi(EM;UU) < 
e
bi(EU;UU) for all parameter values, which violates condition (14), one of the
the necessary conditions for l = fEM;UUg.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let rm u choose lu = UM as its optimum strategy after integration. FDI diversion in U
requires le = EU to be dominated by any other strategy for rm e. The necessary condition is
eai(EU;UM) < 
e
ai(EE;UM) (19)
which yields
[+ zN + cM   2(1 + t)zN   2cN ]2
9
<
[+ zN + cM   2(1 + t)zN   2cM ]2
9
(20)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (20) and simplifying yields cM < cN which is
always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let rm e choose le = EE as its optimum strategy. FDI creation in M by rm u requires
lu = UU to be dominated by lu = UM .
uai(EE;UU) < 
u
ai(EE;UM) (21)
which yields
[(1  t)+ zN + cN   2(1  t)(zN + cN )]2
9(1  t)2 <
[(1  t)+ zN + cN   2(1  t)(zN + cM )]2
9(1  t)2 (22)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (22) and simplifying yields cN > cM which is
always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proof of Proposition 3
For l = fEU;UUg before integration, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions are
ubi(EU;UU) > 
u
bi(EU;UM) (23)
ebi(EU;UU) > 
e
bi(EM;UU) (24)
For l = fEM;UMg after integration, the necessary condition is
eai(EM;UM) > 
e
ai(EE;UM) (25)
Suppose that (23) holds. Expression (24) yields
[(1  t)1=2   (1  t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)  (1  t)1=2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
(26)
+cN [(1 + t)  (1  t)1=2]| {z }
A7
> 0
and expression (25) yields
[(1  t)1=2   (1  t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)  (1  t)1=2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
+ 2cN (27)
 cM [((1  t)1=2 + (1  t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
Provided that t 2 (0; 1); A4 + A7 = 2. Thus, since cN > cM when expression (26) holds, so does
expression (27).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Expected 14+ Observations 6+ Observations
Regressor Sign Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
NAFTA dummy ? 0.40 0 0.49 0.56 1 0.50
US Host dummy ? 0.47 0 0.50 0.14 0 0.35
Mexico Host to
NAFTA dummy ? 0.01 0 0.12 0.01 0 0.09
Mexico Host to
non-NAFTA dummy ? 0.06 0 0.23 0.03 0 0.17
KC Model
realfdi (000s $) N/A 5,035 699.7 15,365 2,864 195.8 11,421
sumgdp (mill. $) + 2,912 1,830 2,736 2,105 1,213 2,448
gdpdi¤sq - 1.2E07 1.2E06 2.2E07 7.8E06 311,543 1.87E07
d2skdgdpd (ILO) - 11.67 0 164.1 2.933 0 126.2
d2skdsumg (ILO) ? 95.85 0 198.8 74.96 1.415 158.1
d1skdsumg (ILO) - 205.4 9.782 409.0 156.0 0 362.0
Skill source (ILO) + 0.264 0.283 0.098 0.267 0.288 0.102
Skill host (ILO) ? 0.271 0.290 0.094 0.261 0.282 0.099
d2skdgdpd (B/L) - 546.7 0 3,621 98.35 0 2,965
d2skdsumg (B/L) ? 2,112 0 5,085 1,548 0 4,046
d1skdsumg (B/L) - 8,744 630.0 16,358 6,307 1,070 13,625
Skill source (B/L) + 8.340 8.859 1.952 7.642 8.395 2.516
Skill host (B/L) ? 9.002 9.161 2.525 8.801 9.027 2.205
invcosthost (Index) - 37.97 31.73 12.02 39.56 39.67 11.90
topenhost (%) - 52.03 44.22 45.82 60.76 52.33 51.17
topensrc (%) + 64.05 52.44 50.51 72.10 59.55 55.01
distance (km) ? 6,462 6,257 4,893 6,766 6,909 4,963
Gravity Model
lrealfdi N/A 6.504 6.588 2.226
lgdphost + 6.823 6.713 1.389
lgdpsrc + 5.898 5.785 1.298
ldistance ? 8.269 8.731 1.181
lgdpchost + 9.792 9.984 0.549
lgdpcsrc + 9.751 9.898 0.461
lopenhost - 3.698 3.789 0.702
lopensrc + 3.943 3.960 0.642
seahost + 0.937 1 0.242
seasrc + 0.908 1 0.289
lang + 0.175 0 0.380
border + 0.098 0 0.088
colony + 0.079 0 0.270
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Table 4: Prais-Winsten Regression: Basic Results
(1) (2) (3)
Regressor 14+ observation 6+ observations Announcement
E¤ect
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -98.22 584.0 417.8
U.S. FDI (1) (1,801) (1,677) (1,760)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 6,579** 6,806** 5,836**
NAFTA FDI in Mexico (2) (2,742) (3,035) (2,780)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -1,174 -677.6 -931.9
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico (3) (722.0) (438.3) (761.4)
Simple di¤erence -676.3 163.3 -521.0
U.S. FDI ( + 1) (1,744) (1,461) (1,691)
Simple Di¤erence 6,001** 6,385** 4,897*
NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 2) (2,581) (2,787) (2,603)
Simple Di¤erence -1,752** -1,098* -1,871**
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 3) (804.1) (575.8) (855.1)
sumgdp 12.11*** 7.347*** 12.09***
(1.433) (0.743) (1.450)
gdpdi¤sq -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
d2skdgdpd -16.12*** -15.06*** -15.95***
(2.696) (2.262) (2.735)
d2skdsumg 4.488* 5.034** 2.787
(2.560) (2.161) (2.417)
d1skdsumg -9.612*** -9.327*** -10.68***
(1.529) (1.157) (1.498)
invcosthost -7.063 -45.35*** 24.75
(40.59) (16.82) (40.24)
openhost 30.36*** 14.30*** 34.27***
(4.910) (1.854) (5.188)
opensrc 28.50*** 9.911*** 31.23***
(6.507) (1.662) (7.161)
distance -0.466*** -0.180*** -0.501***
(0.112) (0.045) (0.117)
Number of obs. 2,922 5,545 2,922
R2 0.30 0.26 0.30
Wald 2 746.0 498.4 473.7
Prob > 2, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.772 0.789 0.772
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for
rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are estimated separately for each country pair.
Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details.
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Table 5: Prais-Winsten Regression: The Gravity Model
(4) (5)
Regressor Standard Specication Extended Specication
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -0.190* -0.279***
U.S. FDI (1) (0.105) (0.102)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 0.200** 0.238***
NAFTA FDI in Mexico (2) (0.093) (0.075)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -0.058 0.048
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico (3) (0.103) (0.114)
Simple di¤erence -0.103 -0.195***
U.S. FDI ( + 1) (0.081) (0.072)
Simple Di¤erence 0.288*** 0.322***
NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 2) (0.048) (0.070)
Simple Di¤erence 0.030 0.132*
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 3) (0.061) (0.073)
lgdphost 0.414*** 0.214***
(0.074) (0.081)
lgdpsrc 0.746*** 0.876***
(0.036) (0.042)
ldistance -0.750*** -0.704***
(0.033) (0.051)
lgdpchost 0.591***
(0.104)
lgdpcsrc 2.219***
(0.125)
lopenhost -0.361***
(0.085)
lopensrc 0.121*
(0.070)
seahost 1.725***
(0.171)
seasrc -0.193
(0.135)
lang 1.126***
(0.142)
border 0.217*
(0.130)
colony 0.458***
(0.160)
Number of obs. 2,878 2,878
R2 0.80 0.84
Wald 2 1,612 3,924
Prob > 2, p-value 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.940 0.922
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported).
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
(6) (7) (8)
Regressor Arbitrary VCE Barro/Lee Barro/Lee
14+ observations 6+ observations
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 14,916 727.9 1,324
U.S. FDI (1) (9,109) (1,758) (1,661)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 19,742 5,954** 6,838**
NAFTA FDI in Mexico (2) (16,674) (2,329) (2,748)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,746*** -990.6 -440.5
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico (3) (945.7) (700.8) (409.9)
Simple di¤erence 10,468 321.5 952.4
U.S. FDI ( + 1) (6,938) (1,784) (1,477)
Simple Di¤erence 15,294 5,548** 6,467**
NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 2) (16,280) (2,205) (2,532)
Simple Di¤erence -8,194*** -1,397* -812.2*
non-NAFTA FDI in Mexico ( + 3) (3,026) (764.3) (491.2)
sumgdp 7.829*** 10.37*** 6.206***
(2.131) (1.303) (0.696)
gdpdi¤sq -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.002**
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
d2skdgdpd -21.52*** 0.797*** 0.479***
(7.464) (0.155) (0.034)
d2skdsumg 16.08*** -1.150*** -0.743***
(5.427) (0.191) (0.108)
d1skdsumg -5.762 -0.661*** -0.658***
(3.854) (0.083) (0.077)
invcosthost -55.47 111.8** 13.79
(61.45) (49.20) (14.71)
openhost 18.36 17.01*** 6.673***
(12.20) (4.712) (1.687)
opensrc 20.40 28.89*** 6.666***
(14.61) (7.017) (1.268)
distance -0.309* -0.731*** -0.333***
(0.160) (0.172) (0.067)
Number of obs. 2,922 3,453 7,730
R2 0.38 0.33 0.25
Wald 2 . 772.7 4,173
Prob > 2, p-value . 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. N/A 0.732 0.757
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported).
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